-------- Original Message --------
| Subject:
|
International Outrage: Influenza A (H1N1)
-
worldwide (02): case counts |
| Date:
|
Fri, 01 May 2009 00:02:31 -0700 |
| From:
|
"Stephen M. Apatow"
<s.m.apatow@humanitarian.net> |
| To:
|
promed@promed.isid.harvard.edu |
Contact: Stephen M.
Apatow
Founder, Director of Research & Development
Humanitarian Resource Institute (UN:NGO:DESA)
Humanitarian University Consortium Graduate Studies
Center for Medicine, Veterinary Medicine & Law
Phone: 203-668-0282
Email: s.m.apatow@humanitarian.net
Internet: www.humanitarian.net
Pathobiologics International
Internet: www.pathobiologics.org
Dear
Colleagues:
The level of outrage regarding the inability of states to conduct on
site
testing for pandemic H1N1, has led to a perception of no confidence
in
the statistics. Without validated tests, municipalities and
states
have no capacity to implement rapid response to this public health
emergency.
Guessing on suspect cases, choosing which ones we will test and waiting
2-3
days because samples need to be shipped to the CDC lab in Atlanta,
represents
a public health infrastructure disgrace.
This scenario brings to mind the sharp comments by the director of DOD
GEIS, who stood up at at my table during the U.S. Medicine Institute
for Health Studies Forum "Food, Air, Water, and Terrorism: Assessing
the Risk" (sponsored by the Department of Defense, Global Emerging
Infections System and Annapolis Center: 29 January 2002), when he
shared with the audience that a public
health infrastructure in the United States did not exist. 6
years
later, in the midst of a WHO pandemic level 5 scenario, I now
understand why
he said what he did. Roger Breeze did the PCR presentation at
this
meeting and my paper "Agricultural Security and Emergency Preparedness:
Protecting One of America's Infrastructures" was a reference point
for agricultural
security.
All I know, is that the Department of Defense can fast track a reagent
within hours for use in hand held satellite linked PCR device.
This molecular
diagnostics technology has existed for years but has not yet reached
the
grassroots physician/veterinarian level. If the United
States
does not have the technological capability for surveillance,
containment
and control, then nor does any other UN member country.
Related
Until
these
gaps have been addressed, there exists no capacity for confidence in
case
counts or epidemiological analysis.
###
|
